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Abstract: 
The article seeks to provide insights into how the EAEU is used and exploited by local actors 
as an economic and political resource. It does so by delving into the preferences and practices 
of Armenian political elites and non-state actors. The article highlights multiple flexibilities in 
the Eurasian integration process. Uncertainties and flaws in the rule-making process create 
loopholes that are then exploited by domestic actors (that is, rule-takers) with a view to 
pursuing their own goals. Thus, processes of rule development and adoption entail a variety of 
nuances also involving translation, adjustment and adaptation. Therefore, the article brings 
strong nuances into the prevailing picture of Eurasian integration as an example of hard 
regionalism, and instead suggests the development of a malleable integration process. 
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Since its inception, the Eurasian Customs Union (ECU, which was upgraded to a 
Eurasian Economic Union, EAEU, in 2015) has been depicted as an ambitious attempt to 
foster regional integration in the post-Soviet space.
1
 This is because of two intertwined 
factors. First, the Eurasian project hinges crucially on Russia’s renewed eagerness and ability 
to promote regional integration. Starting in the mid-2000s, Russia has been prepared to incur 
the costs of regional projects to the extent that these serve its own foreign policy objectives.
2
 
Therefore, in 2010-13 it invested massively in designing, expanding and deepening the 
ECU/EAEU. Second, unlike some other cooperation formats in the post-Soviet space, the 
Eurasian process seems to pursue a clear objective (trade integration) and entails legally 
binding commitments on the part of its member states, as well as delegation to supranational 
institutions. This is especially in contrast to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS),
3
 
in which soft institutional forms of cooperation have de facto prevailed,
4
 thereby making it 
easier to deal with “sovereignty sensitivities”.5 Thus, the Eurasian project has emerged as an 
attempt at “hard region-building”6 and reflects a move toward an advanced and exclusive 
form of integration. In line with Haas’ definition of regional integration, such a move implies 
that “political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, 
expectations and political activities towards a new centre, whose institutions possess or 
demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states”.7  
However, subsequent developments in the Eurasian integration process have 
highlighted the heterogeneous preferences and interests of EAEU member states.
8
 While 
Russia has been prone to extend integration to political issues, other member states (primarily 
one of the founders of the ECU, Kazakhstan) have fiercely opposed this move and instead 
favoured a narrow view of integration, limited to trade issues. Given the asymmetric power 
relations in the EAEU integration process, different views have not necessarily translated into 
open disagreements that would put into question the foundations of the project.
9
 Nevertheless, 
they may result in increased tensions and bargaining in both the adoption of EAEU rules and 
implementation of commitments taken. This is because member states’ positions (while 
constrained by their relative power vis-à-vis other members, primarily Russia) are also driven 
by domestic dynamics and constellations of actors. 
This article regards Eurasian regionalism as a contested process of integration shaped by 
complex interactions between the preferences and interests of the various actors involved in 
the EAEU. Such an actor-centred approach is promising for exploring the interplay between 
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the factors shaping integration. While the literature has started to offer detailed accounts of 
EAEU structures and legal order,
10
 little is still known about how actors at supranational, 
national and subnational levels relate to the deeper integration that the EAEU ambitions to 
develop, and how their preferences interact in the making and implementation of Eurasian 
policies. Yet, how actors “perceive and interpret the idea of a region”11 is crucial to the 
region-building process. This is because regions are not only institutional arrangements. They 
are social constructs and therefore also mirror attempts at “social engineering of a regional 
identity”.12 In this vein, a region reflects actors’ interests, ideas and identities as resulting 
from adaptation to challenges imposed by the actions of others and changing contexts.13 
This article adopts a more agency-centred approach to Eurasian integration by shifting the 
focus of inquiry to the actors involved in the processes of rule-making and rule-taking within 
the EAEU. It asks who the main actors in rule development are, how regional rules are 
perceived by (primarily state) actors and through which processes norms, rules and policies 
are created, adopted and possibly adapted or rejected. The article starts by discussing the 
process of rule-making within the EAEU. Drawing upon the case of Armenia (a country that 
was not among the founding members of the ECU and joined the EAEU in 2015), I then 
explore the dynamics of Eurasian rules adoption and adaptation. The article draws upon 40 
semi-structured interviews conducted at the Eurasian Economic Commission and in Armenia, 
as well as three focus groups conducted in Armenia.
14
 
The picture of ‘hard regionalism’ prevailing in the literature suggests a top-down process of 
rule-making, whereby regional rules and policies are then effectively taken on board and 
implemented by both the member states and domestic non-state actors. Such an understanding 
is premised on the crucial role played by regional organisations in the formulation and 
adoption of rules. Yet the article highlights multiple – and in fact increasing – flexibilities in 
the Eurasian integration process. As the paper argues, uncertainties and flaws in the rule-
making process create loopholes that are then exploited by domestic actors (that is, rule-
takers) with a view to pursuing their own goals. Therefore, the article brings strong nuances 
into the prevailing picture of hard regionalism, and instead suggests the development of a 
malleable integration process. 
 
Rule-making and rule-taking within the Eurasian Economic Union: multiple flexibilities 
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This section seeks to explore the extent to which the Eurasian integration process, presented 
as an example of hard region-building, offers scope for adaptation, interpretation and 
hybridisation of rules. 
By launching the EAEU, Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan (joined in 2015 by Armenia and 
Kyrgyzstan) signed up to an ambitious agenda of deeper integration. This new stage of 
integration supposes major institutional and legal changes. The deeper the integration between 
member countries, the more extensive the common regulatory agenda, the stronger the 
common institutions and the greater the delegation of sovereignty from the member states are 
expected to be.
15
 The deepening of integration is also expected to strengthen the powers of the 
common institutions in fostering compliance from the member states through a variety of 
means, including hard (infringement procedures for non-compliance) and soft (best practices, 
peer pressure) law. Therefore, with the entry into force of the Treaty on the EAEU, the 
Eurasian Union became, according to a top official of the Eurasian Commission, one of the 
“two most advanced integration processes in the world”, together with the EU.16  
In essence, the Treaty on the EAEU signed on 29 May 2014
17
 brought about two series of 
changes. First, the Treaty sought to produce a more consistent legal framework by codifying 
the regulations of the ECU
18
 and the Single Economic Space (SES),
19
 both criticised for their 
fragmented regulatory regime. Second, the Treaty envisaged a substantial expansion of 
common regulations in order to establish a single market and remove the remaining barriers to 
internal trade.
20
 In particular, the elimination of non-tariff barriers, regarded as pivotal, was 
expected to result in a substantial increase in trade flows within the EAEU, thereby yielding 
major economic benefits for the member states.
21
 Importantly, the deepening of integration 
also suggested the strengthening of EAEU regulatory institutions,
22
 as has been the case in 
other deep regional integration processes such as that of the European Union (for instance, 
with the reform of the decision-making process in the 1980s in view of the launching of the 
Internal Market; or the new competences deriving from the Treaty of Maastricht and 
associated with the construction of a political as well as an economic Union). Overall, the 
move toward deep integration supposedly signalled a reinforcement of both the common 
institutions and their control over domestic implementation.
23
 This, in turn, was expected to 
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translate into a clear delineation between rule-makers and rule-takers, since advanced stages 
of integration entail an increased delegation of sovereignty on the part of the member states. 
However, four years after the EAEU was established this agenda has yet to materialise. This 
is because the member states have tried to limit the delegation of sovereignty to supranational 
institutions and to preserve their interests.
24
 Therefore, the Treaty provides for many 
exemptions allowing for the persistence of intra-EAEU obstacles to trade. The Eurasian 
Economic Commission (EEC) has identified 450 non-tariff barriers within the EAEU, 80 
percent of which are limitations and exemptions included in the Treaty.
25
 The convergence of 
EAEU rules with international standards will reduce non-tariff barriers in key areas such as 
technical barriers to trade (TBT) and sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards (SPS). However, 
this will only happen gradually, via the creation of new EAEU standards to replace the 
existing ones (mostly inherited from the Soviet GOST system).
26
  
Importantly, the negotiation and application of new EAEU rules has turned out to be a 
difficult process. Delays in effectively setting up a common market for pharmaceuticals and 
medicines and disagreements during the negotiations for the EAEU Customs Code
27
 provide 
the best illustrations of the tensions that derive from member states’ different trade structures, 
degrees of economic openness and political preferences. Ultimately, these tensions hinder 
regulatory harmonisation and therefore deep economic integration within the EAEU. 
Crucially, the Treaty failed to provide for the institutional changes needed to achieve deep 
integration. While envisaging a far-reaching agenda, it did not strengthen the competences of 
the institutions responsible for designing common regulations and ensuring their enforcement. 
According to a high-level official of the Eurasian Commission, the Treaty has provided the 
organisation with “a fully-fledged institutional structure”.28 As compared to the ECU, 
however, the Treaty on the EAEU has conferred increased powers on the member states at the 
expense of the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC) and the EAEU Court.  
For instance, as was the case under the ECU/SES, the decisions of the Commission are legally 
binding on the member states and have a direct effect. In practice, however, the powers of the 
Commission are substantially limited because of two factors. First, EAEU member states 
retain a pivotal role in the decision-making process. While the Treaty on the EAEU provides 
for qualified majority voting, the latter is primarily used for “routine issues”.29 High-level 
officials within the Eurasian Commission argue that “qualified majority voting is the rule and 
consensus is an exception” within the Council of the Commission, yet they also recognise that 
if a member of the Council has strong objections to a decision, the latter is not adopted.
30
 In 
fact, sensitive issues are decided by consensus within the Supreme Council of the Eurasian 
Union, the EAEU’s overarching body gathering the head of states. Interestingly, the 
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importance devoted to consensus in the EAEU’s decision-making process is presented by top 
officials of the Eurasian Economic Commission as a safeguard for small member states 
against an overwhelming Russia in that it provides them with a say over decisions to be 
made.
31
 Such an interpretation, however, downplays the multifaceted leverages that Russia 
can use as a result of power asymmetries in bargaining with other EAEU members. The 
prevalence of consensus has far-reaching implications on the EAEU’s decision-making 
process. Crucially, a member state can ask that a decision made by the Commission (even if 
adopted by the Collegium) be repealed or amended.
32
 Therefore, in practice, pivotal decisions 
are made within the Council or the Supreme Council, the highest inter-governmental bodies. 
 Second, the implementation of EAEU rules, standards and policies lies with the member 
states and the Commission has only limited enforcement capacities. In the case of rule 
infringement, the Commission can indicate that a member state does not comply with the 
provisions of the Treaty on the EAEU, but it cannot take action against member states before 
the Court; only other member states can. This is in contrast to the previous integration efforts, 
when the Commission could (even if with limitations) refer a member state to the Court, after 
informing the state and establishing a time frame to address non-compliance.
33
 Interestingly, 
in the Eurasian Commission’s narrative the limited monitoringpowers are justified by the 
Soviet past: “We all lived in the Soviet Union, so we’re afraid of what enforcement means 
and entails”.34 
Therefore, not only do the member states retain key powers in the EAEU decision-making 
process; in addition, supranational bodies have no or limited possibilities to ensure the 
enforcement of EAEU rules. This suggests that the implementation of EAEU rules is also 
primarily left to the discretion of the member states. For instance, the implementation of 
EAEU sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards (SPS, a core trade area) is controlled by the 
member states, not the EEC.35 Member states identify cases of non-compliance and can then 
either reinforce the control, or apply temporary restrictions over those products or enterprises 
that do not comply with EAEU regulations. This has given rise to ‘trade wars’ between EAEU 
member states, as was the case between Russia and Belarus in the aftermath of the counter-
sanctions introduced by Russia vis-à-vis EU products, when it became blatant that Western 
products transited through Belarus en route to the Russian market.
36
 The Russian Federal 
Service for Surveillance on Consumer Rights Protection and Human Wellbeing 
(Rospotrebnadzor) reacted by prohibiting the entry of Belarusian meat and milks products on 
the ground that these were “in violation of sanitary norms”.37 This not only indicates a ‘major 
flaw’ in Eurasian integration, since SPS standards are supposed to be harmonised among 
member states; it also signals arbitrary interpretations and therefore heterogeneous 
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enforcement of EAEU rules.
38
 Such tensions are also noticeable in the decision left up to 
member states to preserve or cancel all the agreements they had signed prior to joining the 
EAEU, including trade agreements.
39
 This indicates that, by using pre-existing bilateral or 
multilateral agreements member states retain a major leeway in external trade policy, a core 
competence of the Union.  
Crucially, the Treaty on the EAEU does not provide a clear definition of the division of 
competences between the Union and its member states. While this division is obvious in 
specific areas (e.g. external customs tariffs, external trade policy and related technical 
regulations), it is much more vague in most other policies, defined as “coordinated” or 
“harmonised” by the Treaty.40 In fact, a list of EAEU competences was prepared during the 
negotiations for the draft Treaty on the EAEU,
41
 yet it was eventually abandoned as member 
states were reluctant to relinquish part of their sovereignty and therefore rejected the idea of 
defining distinct EAEU competences during the negotiations.
42
  
The lack of a clearly defined list of competences is not per se an obstacle to further 
integration, as was demonstrated by the EU for several decades. However, top-level officials 
of the Eurasian Commission regard this lack of definition as a pivotal difference from the 
EU.
43
 The member states have diverse reasons for engaging in Eurasian integration, but none 
of them is interested in deep integration . Thus, they have been seeking to minimise their 
obligations.
44
 In essence, the lack of clearly defined competences can be used by member 
states as an ad hoc instrument to hamper further integration whenever it does not match their 
preferences.  
Therefore, while reflecting a formal commitment to further integration, the Treaty on the 
EAEU does not provide the legal and institutional bases regarded as prerequisite for 
deepening integration. Both the limited powers of the ‘supranational’45 institutions and the 
unclear division of competences suggest that the Eurasian Economic Commission’s roles as 
rule-maker and rule-keeper (that is, ‘guardian of the treaties’ akin to the role played by the 
European Commission in the EU) are strongly constrained.
46
 This is due to the fact that the 
member states are reluctant to act merely as rule-takers. In other words, “member states are 
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attempting to use economic integration to strengthen sovereignty and this is reflected in the 
institutional arrangements of the EAEU, but also the tensions and coordination problems that 
exist among them”.47 
In sum, key actors of the Eurasian integration process (including the Russian president) 
explicitly identify the preservation of member states’ sovereignty as a key feature of the 
EAEU: “The transfer of certain powers to the national bodies of the Union does absolutely not 
harm the sovereignty of our countries.”48 Nevertheless, the emergence of the EAEU 
highlights key tensions between, on the one hand, a commitment to further integration and, on 
the other, the reluctance of member states to relinquish their sovereignty and thereby to 
deliver on the ambitious agenda of Eurasian integration.  
 
Rule-taking, rule-breaking or rule-shaping? Armenia and the practice of Eurasian 
integration 
 
In light of the Treaty’s ambiguities, delving into the member states’ practice of Eurasian 
integration is crucial to understanding better the actual scope and degree of region-building. 
This section looks at how Eurasian integration has been perceived and implemented in 
Armenia since the country announced that it would be joining the EAEU in September 
2013.
49
 Examining how this specific country adopts and possibly adapts Eurasian rules, 
standards and policies is especially important, given that Armenia was not among the 
founding members of the ECU and joined the EAEU later under Russian pressure.
50
 In this 
section, I scrutinise how and why Armenian authorities (and non-state actors) have been 
trying to exploit the loopholes in Eurasian integration, in particular with a view to preserving 
close links with the EU. I argue that the ambiguities associated with both the EAEU Treaty 
and the Eurasian integration process in general have enabled the country to preserve a 
significant (even if not unlimited) degree of autonomy in the conduct of its foreign policy. 
Armenia and the EAEU: a constrained accession and limited benefitsI 
In the early 2010s, Armenia purposely remained outside the initial Eurasian integration 
process. Instead of joining the ECU, Armenia chose to step up its cooperation with the EU by 
negotiating (like Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) an Association Agreement (AA) together 
with a Deep and Comprehensive Free-Trade Area (DCFTA). The reasoning behind this 
decision was that, in contrast to the EAEU, the EU was regarded as a legitimate model for 
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Armenia’s much needed economic modernisation in a sharply deteriorating regional context.51 
The substantial regulatory and institutional reforms carried out in 2010-13 to comply with EU 
demands were nevertheless premised on the perceived compatibility with a security alliance 
and close ties with Russia. Yet Armenia’s approach crumbled in 2013, when Russia stepped 
up pressure on Armenia to deter the country from signing an AA/DCFTA with the EU. 
Among other things, Russia concluded a massive arms deal with Azerbaijan (Armenia’s 
adversary over Nagorno-Karabakh) and threatened to increase gas prices substantially. 
Asindicated by an EU official: “They [Armenians] were very committed with key 
recommendations to launch DCFTA negotiations, but there were problems with 
implementation. They lacked capacities, but they wanted to act quickly because of Russia.”52 
Therefore, Armenia’s decision to join the EAEU (a few weeks before it was supposed to 
initial the Association Agreement /DCFTA at the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius) was 
arguably made “under the gun”.53 Given its landlocked situation and its economic and 
security vulnerability, the country had limited capacity to withstand Russian pressure. Yet 
until 2013, Armenia’s political elites (not least Tigran Sargsyan, then Prime Minister, now 
ironically serving as the Chairman of the Board of the EEC) had explicitly ruled out EAEU 
membership.
54
 Indeed, the decision to join the Russia-driven organisation was broadly 
presented as a choice of the Armenian president alone. It came as a surprise to many in 
Armenia, including the officials involved in the negotiations for an association agreement 
with the EU: “It was the decision of the Armenian president, not the decision of Armenia.”55 
This is not to say that the AA and DCFTA were strongly supported by Armenian society. 
Negotiations for the agreements with the EU were technocratic exercises involving small 
groups of experts with scarce information available to the general public, who had limited 
knowledge of both the purpose and substance of the agreements. By contrast, the primary 
driver behind Armenia’s accession to the EAEU – regional vulnerability in the context of the 
Karabakh conflict – was understandable to all. Therefore, alongside Russian pressure, the fact 
that security was not included in the EU’s offer also played a role:  
It is not about what Russia offered. It is about the key sectors for Armenia that the EU did not 
include in its offer. The decision made on September 3
rd
 was predictable had the EU wanted to 
understand what kind of actor Russia is and how it behaves.
56
 
The shift in Armenia’s integration choice, announced by Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan 
in a joint statement with President Putin, was justified ex-post by economic reasons. The 
Armenian president indicated that it made sense to belong to the same security and economic 
alliances. This argument was expanded by a minister of the Eurasian Economic Commission: 
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 We have always had very good economic relations with this country. In addition, Armenia is an active member 
of the CSTO and one of the few states that has always supported Russia in all formats, even on the most 
controversial political issues. But Armenia has never participated in Eurasian integration because of the 
stereotype of a lack of a common border. Until one day we sat down at the table and discussed this issue (...); 
Armenia had a purely economic rationale for joining the EAEU.
57
 
However, while security considerations were indeed crucial in accounting for Armenia’s 
decision,
58
 the economic rationale has not been validated by facts. Apart from maintaining 
cheap prices for Russian gas, accession to the EAEU has brought no clear economic benefits 
for Armenia thus far. First, it initially resulted in an increased external tariff,
59
 given that the 
ECU’s initial common external tariff was broadly aligned to Russia’s tariff schedule and 
therefore much higher than Armenia’s (a member of the World Trade Organisation since 
2003). This caused significant concern in Armenia about violation of its WTO commitments 
that would result from the adoption of the EAEU tariff.
60
 Second, Armenia reaps only limited 
benefits from the redistribution of common customs duties, as the country receives only 1.13 
percent of the total custom duties.
61
 Third, accession to the EAEU held the promise of 
increased Armenian exports to a large market
62
 – a promise which seemingly materialised, as 
shown by the 82 percent surge in Armenian exports to Russia in 2016 as compared to 2015. 
Nevertheless, this increase in trade flows to Russia primarily reflected a compensation effect 
after the Russian economic crisis. Actually, EAEU accession resulted in a diversification of 
Armenian trade away from non-EAEU partners (primarily the EU) and “forced an artificial 
re-orientation of the Armenian economy”63 (towards Russia) given the country’s weak links 
with other EAEU members. It also delayed or even undermined the country’s push for 
modernisation given that Armenia exports low-quality goods to Russia. Combined with the 
limited progress in the EAEU’s legal harmonisation agenda, this creates few incentives for the 
country to reform and become more competitive (especially as compared to a DCFTA in 
force, as the latter would have entailed effective regulatory convergence with the EU’s 
advanced technical standards).  
Muddling through with Eurasian integration 
Although Armenia’s U-turn was made abruptly in the wake of increasing Russian security 
pressure on the country, Armenia tried to preserve some degree of autonomy by seeking new 
arrangements with the EU. Accession to the EAEU did not put an end to the country’s 
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complementarity policy. Initiated in the early 2000s by then Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Vartan Oskanian, this policy was premised upon a strategic alliance with Russia 
complemented by the search for new partnerships with NATO and the EU. In essence, 
accession to the EAEU put an end to any hope of combining Russia’s security umbrella with 
adherence to the EU’s economic model. However, it only made the search for 
complementarity more relevant (even if only to hedge against overwhelming dependence on 
Russia). A few weeks after his decision to join the EAEU was made public, the Armenian 
president announced that his country would be seeking a new, far-reaching agreement with 
the EU, and reiterated the pivotal role of the European model and its perceived legitimacy for 
Armenia:  
 Building and strengthening Armenian nationhood upon a European model has been a conscious choice 
of ours, and that process is hence irreversible. Our major objective is to form such mechanisms with the 
EU that on the one hand would reflect the deep nature of our social, political and economic relationship, 
and on the other – would be compatible with other formats of co-operation.
64
 
 
While both the EU and Armenia agreed on the need to redefine their relationship, a key 
challenge was to identify the possible scope for a new EU-Armenia agreement, taking into 
account the country’s commitments under the EAEU. This exercise, undertaken in 2014-15, 
turned out to be more difficult than expected since the scope of Armenia’s obligations vis-à-
vis the EAEU remains unclear.
65
 Upon joining the EAEU, Armenia signed up to a 
comprehensive agenda of integration. However, it also secured some 800 exemptions during 
accession negotiations, as a result of which it will not have to comply fully with EAEU tariffs 
until 2022.
66
 Currently, these exemptions represent a significant share (approximately 40 
percent) of Armenia’s imports from non-EAEU countries.67  
More generally and crucially for Armenia, as a consequence of the EAEU Treaty’s lack of 
precision in the definition of competences in a number of policy areas, the resulting 
obligations for the member states remain insufficiently defined.
68
 Combined with “future-
oriented commitments, institutional flexibility, and weak common institutions and 
enforcement mechanisms”, this means that “the specific nature of commitments, the progress 
of integration” as well as “motivation for implementation of any of the obligations 
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undertaken” are determined on an ad hoc basis, through inter-state bargaining.69 In this 
context, it is perhaps unsurprising that the new agreement with the EU was shaped by 
Armenia’s interpretation of its commitments as an EAEU member and its broader quest for 
complementarity.  
The Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) negotiated in 2015-17 and 
initialled on 27 March 2017 is expected to be “an important step to broaden the scope of 
bilateral relations”70 between the EU and Armenia. Admittedly, other EAEU members have 
signed agreements with the EU after accession to the EAEU, such as Kazakhstan with the 
Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement signed in 2015. However, the CEPA is 
much wider-ranging and ambitious (as reflected in the use of the word ‘comprehensive’ in its 
title).
71
 For instance, the trade title of the CEPA includes almost all chapters that were in trade 
title of the draft EU-Armenia DCFTA.
72
 Yet the scope of commitments taken on by Armenia 
as part of the CEPA varies substantially depending upon its obligations as an EAEU member. 
Given the country’s loss of sovereignty over external trade, the CEPA is not a free-trade 
agreement. In addition, in core trade policy areas such as SPS, CEPA commitments are 
drastically reduced with respect to those included in the draft EU-Armenia DCFTA. Likewise, 
CEPA does not go beyond WTO arrangements on technical barriers to trade (TBT).
73
 This 
means that unlike associated countries with a DCFTA in force, EU rules and standards – the 
acquis communautaire – do not serve as a reference point in the EU-Armenia agreement. 
Instead, the CEPA refers to international standards such as the WTO’s, which are regarded as 
less advanced than the EU’s. However, the scope of cooperation is expected to be more 
extensive in other policy areas such as public procurement (with the CEPA providing further 
mutual access to both sides), and to some extent services (with the CEPA providing mutual 
access in service markets, albeit with some exceptions). Interestingly, these policy areas, 
especially services, are part of the EAEU agenda. Yet, the Treaty on the EAEU only paves the 
way for coordination of trade in services between member states and third parties without any 
supranational jurisdiction of the EAEU in this respect.
74
  
Therefore, the inclusion of services in the CEPA suggests that Armenia makes use of every 
limitation of EAEU competences to expand ties with the EU. This is not to say that Armenian 
authorities and bureaucracy systematically oppose the adoption and application of EAEU 
rules. They prefer to explain this piecemeal implementation by the fact that Eurasian 
integration is still in the making: “A lot of regulations are not fully implemented yet … . It is a 
process”.
 75 However, they also place emphasis on the uncertainties linked to this process: 
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There are many uncertainties in and around the Eurasian integration process, especially after the conflict 
in Ukraine. Armenia’s position is ‘wait and see’. We negotiated around 800 exemptions until 2022; this 
brings uncertainty but also capacity to manoeuvre, as we don’t know what will be in 2022.76 
Significantly, the ambiguities of the EAEU open a window of opportunity for Armenia to 
shape rules within the organisation. Since it joined the EAEU, Armenia has been trying to 
disseminate some of the EU standards it adopted in 2010-13, when it was negotiating the 
Association Agreement and DCFTA with the EU. As a result of these successful negotiations 
with the EU and the reforms they entailed, Armenia is regarded within the Eurasian Economic 
Union as a frontrunner from which other member states, and in fact the EAEU itself, can draw 
inspiration.
77
 This is for instance the case in financial markets, an area subjected to extensive 
reform as part of the DCFTA and which the Armenian side unsuccessfully tried to push 
further when negotiating the CEPA with the EU.
78
 Thus, the Armenian authorities have been 
seeking to make the most of their experience with both regionalist projects, be it their 
successfully concluded (yet never implemented) negotiations for a DCFTA with the EU or 
their constrained accession to the EAEU. 
While the Armenian authorities combine rule-taking and rule-shaping in their attitude to the 
EAEU, Armenian small businesses exporting to the EU have developed various adaptation 
strategies since their country joined the EAEU. For instance, while implementing major 
EAEU rules such as labelling, they seek to maintain, or even expand, exports to the EU, by 
using, among other things, the easier market access offered to Georgia as part of its DCFTA 
and creating joint-ventures in Georgia. This is because they are acutely aware of the 
ambiguities associated with the EAEU: “This story about a market with almost 200 million 
consumers is a fairy tale, especially with Russia not having a stable legal framework. 
However, we are not prevented from entering the EU market.”79 
Thus, interviews highlight a congruence of vision and interests between the political elite and 
business circles. The narrative of both state and non-state actors within Armenia tends to 
downplay the importance of formal rules set by the supranational institutions within the 
EAEU and highlight the use of bilateral links by the member states (primarily Russia) and the 
informal processes set in motion by domestic actors (for example, from the private sector). 
Certainly, the lack of systematic and comprehensive data makes it difficult to infer causal 
explanations from this congruence; in particular, given both the dearth of data on Armenian 
large businesses and close links between Armenian political and economic elites, it is not 
possible to assess their respective influence in pushing for closer links with the EU. Yet it is 
important to note the emergence of formal channels of dialogue between the Armenian 
authorities, the EU and Armenian businesses, as illustrated by the creation of a European 
Business Association in 2015. 
80
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Therefore, Armenian actors (whether authorities or business circles) have sought to preserve 
some degree of autonomy by developing links with non-EAEU actors (primarily the EU) after 
their constrained accession to the EAEU. This quest has been underpinned by a strong identity 
and normative dissonance with the EAEU which, unlike the EU, has never been regarded as a 
model for the country to follow. Nevertheless, Armenia’s search for multiple partnerships is 
subject to Russia’s acceptance of this policy because of its leverages, whether in inter-state 
bargaining within the EAEU or in bilateral links. Both Russia and the EAEU indicated that 
there was no reason to oppose the new EU-Armenia agreement, since it is compatible with the 
commitments taken on by Armenia as part of EAEU.
81
 However, Armenia’s future ability to 
preserve some degree of autonomy critically hinges on Russia’s perception of EAEU 
membership as a sufficient guarantee of loyalty. 
 
Conclusions 
This article has sought to combine an institutionalist analysis of the EAEU with a study of 
actors’ perceptions, identities and strategies in the Eurasian integration process. By delving 
into the preferences and practices of Armenian political elites and non-state actors, it has 
provided insights into how the EAEU is used and exploited by local actors as an economic 
and political resource. 
Armenia’s practice of Eurasian integration shows that the process of rule development is not 
merely circumscribed to a binary approach between rule-making and rule-taking, but entails a 
variety of nuances also involving translation, adjustment and adaptation. Given its small size, 
landlocked location and multifaceted dependence on Russia, Armenia did not seek to resist 
pressure to join the EAEU; and once in the organisation, it has ‘talked the talk and walked the 
walk’. This is because the Armenian leadership regarded membership in the EAEU as a 
means to preserve multifaceted links with Russia. Nevertheless, as illustrated by both the 
negotiations for the new agreement with the EU and the substance of the agreement itself, 
Armenian authorities have thus far interpreted their EAEU commitments in a way that enables 
the country to increase its autonomy and expand ties with the EU to the greatest possible 
extent. Such a strategy is mirrored in Armenian businesses’ interest in closer ties with the EU.  
At the same time, Armenia’s lingering quest for complementarity has been made possible by 
current shortcomings in the Eurasian integration process. Despite the initial claims to achieve 
in “five years what the EU did in fifty”,82 the EAEU is still a long way from implementing the 
commitments taken on in terms of the removal of non-tariff barriers, the setting up of 
common markets in energy and electricity, and the harmonisation of transport, public 
procurement and financial services policies.
83
 Thus, the Eurasian integration process remains 
an incomplete project that (beyond setting up a common tariff and customs code) has not yet 
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succeeded in going beyond “holding-together regionalism”, grounded on a shared “post-
Soviet identity” that justifies its “existence by maintaining pre-existing links”.84 
These findings call for closer scrutiny of actors’ strategies and interaction in the Eurasian 
integration process, whether in rule-making or rule-taking. Armenia’s example is not unique, 
as most EAEU member states have been wary of their prerogatives and have sought to 
develop links with external actors. Yet the variety of actor constellations in EAEU institutions 
and member states, as well as their specific identities, calls for in-depth sociological 
investigations of their perceptions of, and strategies in the Eurasian integration process.  
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